The European Union at stake? A comparative analysis on the dimensions of EU decisionmaking in crisis settings by Kipp, Franziska
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
Dissertations and Theses City College of New York 
2016 
The European Union at stake? A comparative analysis on the 
dimensions of EU decisionmaking in crisis settings 
Franziska Kipp 
CUNY City College 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cc_etds_theses/596 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 








The European Union at stake? A comparative analysis on the dimensions of EU decision-
making in crisis settings 
 




Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of International 
Affairs at the City College of New York  
 
COLIN POWELL SCHOOL FOR CIVIC AND GLOBALL LEADERSHIP 
 
Advisor: Prof. Jacques Fomerand 





This thesis examines how the EU as an international organization deals with international 
crisis situations by looking at its functions and imperfections in its decision-making process. 
Drawing from theoretical organization theory insights, particularly realism and constructivism, 
as well as empirical findings derived from two case studies, the goal if this study is to identify 
the dimensions of crises and find an answer to the question which factors influence decisions on 
crisis management. The Eurozone crisis and the Refugee crisis serve as case studies to 
investigate the narrative of crises in order to explain process outcomes. In both case studies I 
established a time frame in which the most important decisions concerning this particular crisis 
took place. For the Eurozone crisis I look at the period from 2010 to 2011/12 and for the Refugee 
crisis at 2014-2015. Both situations are analyzed with a view to identify the factors i.e. a. 
government interests, b. normative positions, c. coalitions, and d. domestic considerations 
playing a role in determining policy outcomes in crisis settings. As laid out in the theoretical 
framework, the underlying assumption for the hypothesis is that in decision-making processes, 
rational choice theory determines a common strategy, which is based on the decisions of the 
most influential countries. I aim at explaining policy outcomes in specific contentious situations. 
Although, there have always been issues that challenge the EU decision-making in crisis 
situations. These challenges have recently reached a new intensity, which required a coherent 
and increasingly rapid response. This matter has not been sufficiently addressed in current 
research. This study should accordingly contribute to a better understanding of crisis 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
In recent years there has been an expanding literature on the question how the 
European Union manages crises that occur within the Union and affect different member 
states. Observable decision-making processes within the European Union are very 
complex. All of the member state governments and the EU’s supra-national political 
institutions, the EU Commission, and the European Parliament play very important roles. 
Additionally, in certain policy fields such as monetary policy, specialized institutions 
such as the European Central Bank have principal parts.1 It can be observed that even 
thought the principle of subsidiarity aims to regulate competences among member states2; 
these become shared responsibilities in crisis settings which demand a coherent response. 
Recent experiences like the European Debt and the Refugee crisis have put widely held 
convictions about European values to the test as the member states struggle to address 
these shared responsibilities.  
The Eurozone crisis serves as an example for what can be observed as a 
successful response to crisis and consensual crisis management. In 2009 the bank crisis, 
which started in the US hit Europe and developed into a financial crisis. Some EU 
countries such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus, became unable to borrow 
on financial markets at reasonable interest rates. As a consequence, the EU was requested 
to step in leading to, the creation of a crisis resolution mechanism designed to prevent the 
                                            
1 Helen Wallace/Mark Pollack, Policy-Making in the European Union (Oxford University 
2 Treaty on the European Union, Article 5 TEU, Europa Datenbank, Published by The 
European Union, Brussels, Belgium, Accessed: Online   March 22 2016.  
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collapse of the banking system. Mainly on the basis of joint proposals by a German and 
French coalition, the EU was able to launch a Europe-wide recovery program to 
safeguard jobs and social protection levels and to support economic investment. The 
response to the crisis created a new and permanent financial backstop - the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM)-, which is now an integral part of the EU’s comprehensive 
strategy to ensure financial stability.3 This shows how countries were able to at least in 
part accept and agree on proposed solutions in order to save the union.  
However, it is also evident that the EU sometimes encounters difficulties in 
reaching a common position. An instance of this situation may be found in the still 
unfolding refugee crisis. Throughout this crisis, which started in 2011, the constant flow 
of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in addition to waves of Syrian refugees have caused 
tensions in the EU with member states like Greece and Italy feeling over-burdened. 
Several measures have been taken to cope with the influx of refugees and distribute 
resources across EU countries. Even though, decisions have been made concerning the 
humanitarian issue of this crisis, many of the most affected countries still feel like they’re 
left alone. In my thesis I make the assumption that the lack of a consensus among the 
most powerful countries and lack of a common strategy results in a diversification of 
approaches to the crisis. This makes the response in this case less efficient.  
The academic literature, crisis management often separates prevention and 
preparedness from of recovery and change. While the subject of preparedness is mostly 
                                            
3 The European Commission, Newsroom: The Economic Crisis, The European Response, 
The European Union, Brussels, Belgium, 2015. 
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concerned with questions as how an organization or society can prepare for the unknown, 
the area of recovery and change is concerned with the aftermath of crises. This thesis will 
be placed in the middle of those in the domain of coping with crisis.4 The questions asked 
are therefore, how crisis managers make decisions under circumstances of uncertainty, 
time pressure, and extreme threat? Which are the exogenous and endogenous factors that 
lead to those decisions, and who are the main decision makers in the case of the European 
Union? I argue that both the Eurozone crisis and the Refugee crisis are examples of 
developments, which challenge ordinary legislative procedures. Under ordinary 
circumstances the European Commission prepares legislative proposals, which are then 
forwarded concurrently to the European Parliament, the Council and national parliaments 
and, in some cases, to the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social 
Committee.5 The European Parliament then reviews the proposals, as does the Council, 
and they can propose amendments. If the Council and the Parliament cannot agree upon 
amendments, a second reading takes place.6 
 
In this work, I question whether crisis situations demand interfacing and 
cooperation among EU institutions and of member states as posited by constructivists or 
whether it is primarily member states which decide in their own best interest according to 
                                            
4 Bruce Dayton, “Managing Crises in the Twenty-First Century”, International Studies 
Review, Issue 6 (1), 2004, p. 170. 
5 European Parliament, About Parliament: Ordinary Legislative Procedure (Published by 
The European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium. Last updates September 2015) 
6 Helen Wallace, Policy Making in the EU, p. 11. 
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realists. Two case studies focusing on a four-step analysis will help me answer this 
question and identify the most influential decision-makers as well as the underlying 
factors contributing to their decisions. There is a large body of research on decision-
making in the European Union but little is known on crisis situation processes. From the 
evidence presented in this thesis, it seems that realism is the best tool to understand crises 
situations as the consensus between the most powerful EU member states plays a key role 
in policy outcome. This significantly differs from the above described “routine” 
legislative procedure insofar as EU institutions are circumvented and proposals initiated 
by member states and rapidly ratified to achieve a timely solution. In reaching these 
conclusions, this thesis may hopefully contribute to crisis management research in the EU 










Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
 
The underlying problem, which gave rise to this research is Europe's struggle to 
cope with crisis situations. At first these different crises, namely the Eurozone crisis and 
the refugee crisis do not seem to have a lot in common. But in each of these cases the EU 
capability to make decisions and find a coherent outcome to manage was challenged. The 
question concerning these situations is how the EU when facing crises makes decisions 
and what factors influence these decisions. What are the mechanisms that apply when a 
rapid response is required and what influences the choices EU member states make. 
A review of the current literature shows that many scholars have studied and 
addressed crisis situations in the EU. An important contribution to the growing literature 
was made by Grönvall who looked into the struggle between the different EU bodies (for 
example between the Council and the Commission and focused attention on their 
overlapping responsibilities. The study was based on the “Mad Cow Disease” also known 
as BSE, which posed a threat to the EU. Grönvall examined how the institutions worked 
together in this case and argued that overall, there was a growing need for interaction 
between member states and EU bodies arising from their shared responsibilities.7 I agree 
with Grönvall’s argument that there is an interaction between the EU bodies and it is my 
intent to look further into. Even though, Grönvall drew attention to important 
                                            
7 Jesper Grönvall, Managing Crisis in the European Union: The Commission and ‘Mad 




responsibilities for the EU in crisis situations and recommended more interaction and 
cooperation, it would be interesting to look at the willingness of states to cooperate 
through these bodies in a particular crisis situation. Based on his study of BSE and the 
shared responsibilities he identifies, the case studies utilized in this thesis will probe into 
these patterns of cooperation and the formation of coalitions involving the most powerful 
member states. .   
An interesting study by Larsson, focused on crisis management in the European 
Union. The main research question he posed was how the EU handles ´low politics´ 
crises, which he defines as crises, which are not urgent international issues at the highest 
political level. By identifying factors such as domestic politics and member state interest 
this research is relevant to my approach. Furthermore, the underlying assumption Larsson 
made in his study and which I choose as an underlying theme is that the kind of decision-
making in crisis, in certain aspects, differs from political and bureaucratic decision-
making. From that assumption follows the conviction that although every crisis has 
unique characteristics and circumstances, there are recurrent patterns that unite decision-
making features in crises.8 
Another study by Simon Duke looked at EU crisis management from an 
international perspective. Duke focused on EU security and defense and tried to explain 
the development of EU crisis capacity by highlighting institutional structures of EU 
external relations in order to identify that the most important challenge for the EU to 
manage  
                                            
8 Sara Larsson et al., Crisis Decision Making in the European Union (CRISMART, 
Stockholm, Sweden, 2005) p. 125. 
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 is the cooperation among member states to allocate and distribute resources.9 
Even though, Duke formed a very wholesome approach, which looked into every aspect 
of international crisis management and member state resources, he does not address the 
motivations which drive member states to cooperate or makes them hesitate. His final 
conclusion is that member states need to cooperate and it will be important to look at the 
incentives that make states do so.  
Many students of EU decisions deal with lobby groups that have a stake in the 
decision making process. Natalie Lockwood, for example, identifies factors that influence 
decision making in international organizations, she also highlights the phenomenon of 
international vote buying among states whereby states offer material benefits to other 
states in exchange for their votes or support.10 Even though, she identifies vote buying as 
important factor in decision-making, this research mostly focuses on the general 
procedures and there is little research, which includes lobbying or vote buying as 
influencing factors in the EU's response to transnational crisis and emergencies and the 
influence on EU crisis management. 
Important steps concerning exactly these components of transnational crises and 
emergencies has been uncovered by Arjen Boin and Magnus Ekengen in their book “The 
European Union as Crisis Manager: Patterns and Prospects”. Both authors use the term 
                                            
9 Simon Duke, 2002, The EU and Crisis Management Development and Prospects, 
(European Institute of Public Administration, Indiana University, Indiana, 2002) p. 187. 
10 Natalie Lockwood, “International Vote Buying”, Harvard International Law Journal, 
Volume 54, Number 1, 2013, pp. 1-60. 
 8 
“transboundary”11 to describe specifically those crises, which affect more than one 
member state but are managed by the European Union without turning into an 
international crisis. They explore the transboundary dimensions of crises and disasters 
and discuss how traditional crisis management challenges are affected by an increase in 
‘transboundedness’ and tried to explain what would be needed to deal with these 
challenges. The concept of transboundary crisis relates to my thesis in the way that I want 
to explore which member states are especially affected in the case studies I chose and 
how states act in crisis settings that involve different member states across EU 
boundaries.  Another study by Boin's study about transboundary crisis based empirical 
case studies and tried to develop theories about crisis typology and specific theoretical 
and administrative challenges.12 Another recent study by Boin asks a similar question and 
enhances his further research by trying to identify the role the European Union plays in 
transboundary management in general and questions the capacity that the EU has and 
what is needed to manage crises and how resources are distributed among states.13 I am 
going to include the aspect of capacity in my research as far as I am looking at how 
resources are distributed when facing a crisis. 
                                            
11  Arjen Boin et al., The European Union as Crisis Manager: Patterns and Prospects 
(Cambridge University Press, University Printing House, Cambridge, United Kingdom), 
2013, p. 101. 
12 Boin et al., The European Union as Crisis Manager: Patterns and Prospects, p. 100. 
13 Magnus Ekengren et al., Managing Transboundary Crises: The Emergence of 
European Union Capacity, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 18(4), 
2014, p. 20.  
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Overall, the literature on decision-making processes and factors that influence 
decision-making is broad but seems to only cover certain aspects of decision making. 
This literature includes studies on the bodies of the EU, the capacity distribution, and the 
interaction between member states. However, it seems like there is a gap to explore not 
only about who makes the decisions in crisis situations and which bodies have the most 
to say in the process but also to reflect on case studies because there is only limited 
research on specific cases so far. I have accordingly decided to choose to study cases 
from different policy areas and the similarities between them, so that I can examine 
whether it is possible to speak of a specific EU way of crisis decision-making. Larsson 
and Boin have made important contributions to the literature on transboundary crisis 
management, and especially Arjen Boin has framed a new term in crisis management, 
which helps further research to be more specific. The outcomes of these studies are 
mainly to form theories on how the EU can use its capacities feasible and cooperate to 
manage crises when they occur. Putting cooperation in the center of most studies it seems 
that there is a need for an approach, which looks more scientifically at the case studies to 
see which theory actually applies and without assuming that cooperation is the only 
necessary tool.  
In theory we find four explanatory factors derived from the two most important 
approaches to social inquiry: rationalism and constructivism. Existing literature suggests 
that coalition patterns are based on power, interests, ideology, or culture. Both theories 
aim to explain the policy outputs of the European Union. The power-based and interest-
based factors originate from rational choice theory that stresses strategic choice as the 
driving force behind human decisions. The actor rationally chooses the alternative he 
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most prefers. It positions a value-maximizing choice within specified constraints.14 As 
well as in situations of interdependent choice: actors will of necessity behave 
strategically, that is, will take others' expected actions into account. Most fundamentally, 
preferences for integration result from critical positive or negative interdependence. 
Actors seek policy integration if they are convinced to gain net benefits that turn out 
higher than from unilateral, autonomous or only loosely coordinated national policies. 
According to this approach, we would expect steps of integration taken in the euro crisis 
to be driven by common perceptions of interdependence and the desire to avoid losses 
and reap benefits. Among the various forms of integration and substantive rules that 
produce such net benefits, actors strive to realize those that maximize their gains.15 
Moreover, rational-choice neo-institutionalism theory assumes that human beings behave 
rationally. Accordingly, institutions like the EU do not change member states’ preference 
function, but have an influence on the way, in which actors try to achieve their goals. 
Rational choice theory moreover focuses on formal rules and assumes that member states 
use institutions to maximize their utility.16  
In Constructivism, an ideology-based and culture-based theory, explanations 
                                            
14 Paul Viotti/ Mark Kauppi, International Relations Theory, 5th Edition, Pearson, 2012, 
p. 39.   
15 Andrew Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism” in Antje 
Wiener and Thomas Dietz, eds. European Integration Theory (Oxford University Press), 
2009, p.67-87. 
16 Mark Pollack, “Theorizing EU Policy-Making” in Helen Wallace, ed. Policy-making in 
the European Union (Oxford University Press), 2005, pp.23. 
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derive their predictive power from shared identities. Agents' interests emerge from and 
are endogenous to interaction with institutional structures. Social norms constitute the 
identity of actors. Collective norms and understandings define the basic "rules of the 
game" in which they find themselves in their interaction.17 Constructivist theory thus 
appears to be a norm-guided approach. Its main assumption is that human beings do not 
exist independently from their environment but interact with the environment while 
shaping it at the same time. From an institutional perspective, this means that actor 
preferences are endogenous to institutions hence they have socially built (constructed) 
roles and institutional rules. According to this approach, European Union institutions 
influence as the actors’ behavior as well as their preferences and identities. 18 
 My research leans towards a realist approach to the European Union and 
will therefore look at factors like member state interest and domestic politics. However, I 
will also take coalition-building and normative positions into account. Even though, 
building coalitions and normative positions are important factors to look at I argue in a 
realist fashion that even if coalitions occur or it appears that normative positions are 
approached, the underlying reason is that states either thrive to improve their gains or try 
to prevent a threat to their sovereignty.  
There is already a good amount of research on decision-making and policy-
making in the European Union. From the literature that I have reviewed so far it seems 
                                            
17 Michael Kaeding, Mapping out Political Europe: Coalition Patterns in EU Decision-
Making, International Political Science Review, Issue 26 (3), 2005, pp. 271-290. 
18 Mark Pollack, Theorizing EU Policy-Making, 2005, p.23. 
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that most studies that focus on EU decision-making center the methodology on one 
significant case study. This however had its flaws since it lacks comparability. As a 
result, I decided to focus on two important case studies to achieve comparability in terms 
of common factors and patterns that I draw from my analysis. Moreover, from this 
literature review I conclude that there is a gap in identifying a theory- driven approach to 
crisis situations, specifically factors that play a role in decisions that are made amidst 
crisis. Most studies mainly considered decisions in a regular setting or focused on which 
EU bodies are mostly involved in decisions. Therefore, I aim at a multifaceted approach 
that combines both looking at EU bodies and member state behavior in a crisis situation 
setting. Therefore, I developed my argument from the background of the most applicable 
theories. This approach takes several factors into account that derive from constructivist 
and realist theory, and which could have an effect on the outcome of decisions made as a 
response to a occurring crises such as Government interest, Normative Positions, 
Coalition-building, bargaining and domestic influence. Overall, this thesis will be a 
complement to the small but growing literature on the developing crisis management 
capacity of the EU. 
My argument is based on the assumption that decision-making in crisis settings 
differs significantly from routine political and bureaucratic decision-making and that 
there are certain discrete and unique patterns characterizing decision-making features in 
crises situations. In order to explore this argument it is important to understand the EU as 
an international actor, and explore the dynamics in the processes behind the formal 
decisions.  
 13 
I argue, that the circumstances that a crisis imposes on the international actors 
prompt them to make a rapid response, which is influenced by different factors. These 
circumstances also generate barriers to the quality of the decision- making process.19 
From the literature review on former studies but also on theoretical approaches to the 
European Union I have identified the following factors as influencing factors: State 
interest, Normative Positions, Coalitions-building, domestic politics.  
Even though crises are pose complex dilemmas, crisis managers often have to 
make coherent decisions without all the information and under conditions of severe time 
constraints.  In the whole process, the initial phase is the most critical and it is on that 
phase that this thesis will focus. Thus, in regard to the Eurozone Crisis I will look at 
2010-2011/2012 when it was most prominent in the European Union, and 2014-2015 at a 
time when the European Union struggled most to cope with the refugee crisis. I make the 
argument that in dealing with crisis situations, the behavior of decision-makers can be 
understood from the standpoint of rational choice theory and the main stakeholders who 
are the most powerful governments are the ones who decide on allocation of resources 
and the determination of policies. In particular, what I am trying to point out is that there 
are a variety of factors, which influence this decision-making because of the given 
complexity of contemporary crises. This complexity can for example lead to the 
perceived need for experts and advisers, which take particular positions during the 
decision-making process. Even though experts provide decision–makers with 
information, it is doubtful that their expertise gives them much influence in shaping 
                                            
19 Bruce Dayton, Managing Crises in the Twenty-First Century, International Studies 
Review, Issue 6 (1), 2004, p. 165-194. 
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policy outcome. Moreover, I argue that crisis managers often struggle with the 
organization of crisis decision-making. Since it is not an ordinary procedure, there is an 
increase in pressure on routine decision-making structures. This can lead to a 
centralization of decisions in the hands of a small group of people, which I argue are the 
ones who are most influential member states. All too often crisis management is also 
assumed to be the exclusive domain of government officials. Even further, I argue that 
most of these crisis decisions in the European Union were made initially by France and 




My Hypothesis are based on the assumption that crisis decision-making differs 
from regular decision-making. As pointed out in my literature review, there are several 
factors like state interest, Normative Positions, Coalitions, and domestic considerations 
that can influence these choices of decision-makers. In my research I test, which of these 
factors turn out to play an important role in decision making and especially what 
influence the consensus between the most influential countries has on the outcome of 
decisions. I argue, that the decisions concerning crisis management depend on consensus 
between the most powerful countries because they have to be made rapidly. Ergo it 
should be shown that if there is no consensus between the stakeholders, the Union 
struggles to reach a coherent decision on how to manage crisis. Therefore, the (i) 
dependent variable is the outcome of decisions and the independent variable (ii) is the 
consensus among stakeholders.  
 
 15 
H1: Consensus among major stakeholders influences the outcome of decisions 
concerning the crisis  
 
 
Moreover, my second hypothesis is that the consensus differs in different crisis 
settings depending on specific influencing factors like State interest, Normative Positions, 
Coalitions, domestic considerations that determine policy choices. This choice, I argue, 
can be comprehended within the framework of rational theory. States tend to choose the 
outcomes that maximize their gains and cooperate only in order to achieve maximization 
or avoid losses. Therefore, (i) independent variables are the factors I have identified 
before, State interest, Normative Positions, Coalitions-building, domestic politics, which 
will be tested against their influence on the (ii) dependent variable consensus.  
H2:  Consensus differs in different crisis settings depending on specific influencing 











Chapter 3 - Methodology 
 
In order to investigate the decision-making process and explain how common 
positions are reached in crisis situations I will rely on a process tracing methodology. 
However, throughout the research process it became evident that a network analysis of 
cooperation between member states does also provide useful insights in order to examine 
which influence this cooperation have on the outcome of decisions overall. Therefore, 
documents that provide evidence of multilateral meetings and other structures, like 
informal meetings as well as common statements on the selected case studies will be 
taken into account.  
I will conduct a four-step analysis based on Stern and Stelius study.  The first step 
is to place the selected crisis in its proper historical and institutional context, which 
enables contextually sensitive interpretations of crisis behavior. The second step is to 
establish a timeline of the most important decisions and to outline the course of events to 
reconstruct what happened. The third step is to select particular decision-making 
occasions. Each decision can be broken down in into components and regarded as a 
sequential process. In this step we are going to look at stimuli and choices of action that 
contributed to the decision as a whole. The final step is to unveil patterns or specific 
aspects in crisis situations that explain how they were managed and provide a basis for 
further comparison. In order to prove whether or not the hypothesis are going to be 
correct steps three and four are particularly important.20 The collection of data for each 
major decision leads to the identification of stakeholders and decision makers along the 
                                            
20 Sara Larsson, Crisis Decision Making in the European Union, 2005, p 14.  
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crisis and their motives. This step will show that the most influential countries determine 
how to manage crisis as well as point out that there is a struggle in crisis management 
when these influential countries are unable to reach consensus among them. The fourth 
step will ultimately elucidate the factors which influence EU crisis management 
decisions, and show that H2 is correct by emphasizing that stimuli and patterns differ 
from event to event depending on what countries have most at stake. The comparability 
of these outcomes will make the study replicable for other cases and contribute to the 
growing literature on EU crisis management. 
 
Case Selection  
 
I choose a comparative case study design to answer my research question and 
selected two recent and timely crises, the Eurozone crisis and the Refugee crisis. The 
criteria for the selection of these two crises might not seem obvious at first. However, I 
was inspired by Paul Krugman who pointed out, that “The Financial crisis that became 
the European debt crisis in 2008, and the refugee crisis might not seem to have anything 
in common. But in each case Europe’s ability to protect itself turns out to have been 
undermined by its imperfect union.”21 This seems to display my underlying question of a 
union characterized by a rather realist approach.  
The Eurozone crisis was managed in a way that bailouts were most felt for 
individual national governments and it is worth looking into the decisions made during 
the process. In particular it is worth looking at which countries were most affected as 
                                            
21 Paul, Krugman, Europe the Unready in New York Times Op-Ed, New York, 
November 2015. 
 18 
opposed to the countries, which ultimately made the most important decisions. The 
Refugee crisis, turned out to be a challenge to crisis management not only because of a 
variety of countries who participated in the decision making process but also because the 
European Union as a whole is committed to the Schengen Agreement and trying to 
maintain its open internal borders while leaving the management of external borders to 
national governments.22 This has caused a setback especially for countries most 
immediately affected by refugee influx, like Greece.  
Comparability is given due to the same institutional structures as well as 
international circumstances: both crises affect all bodies of the EU and require a response 
that involves several member states.  In both cases the European Union is trying to 
manage crises, which affect the whole union. Ideally, Europe would respond to these 
setbacks by strengthening its union and institutions. However, the political will to do so 
seems lacking and instead it seems that the European Union is taking steps back, which 
might ultimately damage the whole Union itself.  
The research goal is to identify certain patterns or specific factors in a particular 
crisis situation that explain the parameters influencing the decisions made. The factors 
identified then provide a basis for comparison between different issue areas. The 
methodology in this research will be a mixed methodology of case studies which are 
focused on explaining outcome process tracing and aim to identify comparative elements 
which will be based on qualitative literature research and the use of original documents. 
In order to analyze decisions in regards to the case examples, several variables were 
chosen to examine crisis response in institutions. Namely, state interest, normative 
                                            
22 Paul, Krugman, Europe the Unready, 2015. 
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positions, coalitions and domestic politics. The variables were identified according to 
findings from former research (see literature review). Therefore, they can serve as 
reliable indicators in this study. Sources for the analytical part of the research in addition 
to the scholarly literature, will be newspaper reports and official documents and the EU 
database, Think tank studies and the secondary literature will also be used. 
Limitations 
 
Limitations to my research could be expected in the way that the sample could be 
too big and the analysis takes too many factors into account. I choose two case studies to 
enhance comparability of my independent variables, but these two case studies both 
cover several years in their time frame and it could become evident that the time frame is 
too large to achieve a depth analysis for both crises. Moreover, the four factors I 
identified to look at as my independent variables are based on theory and literature 
review but despite this empirical framework, four variables might be too many especially 
when applied to two different case studies. In the literature I reviewed this phenomenon 
was actually mentioned as the primary limiting factor, which lead the authors to revert to 
either using one single case study or limiting amount of steps in decision-making they 
wanted to look at. Moreover, the access to appropriate sources concerning the current 
Refugee crisis could be a limiting factor since it is still unfolding and only a small 
amount of research in this area has been published. I will try to cope with this by using 
original documents and find member state and heads of state statements. Finally, my 
research could also be limited through flaws in the assumption that the cases chosen as 
examples are comparable and might actually turn out to be limiting in the way that they 
are not as comparable as assumed.  
 20 
Chapter 4 - The Eurozone Crisis 
 
Step 1:  Historical/ institutional background  
 
January 2009 marked 10 years after the Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) had become a reality in January 1999, when a group of eleven EU member states 
adopted the euro to replace their national currencies with the new common currency for 
financial transactions. Despite initial skepticism for the project of a common monetary 
union, the general perception among policymakers at the end of the euro’s first decade 
was that it had been a success and brought macroeconomic stability. 
In late 2009 however, the newly elected Greek government disclosed that the country’s 
budget deficit was significantly higher than previously estimated and far higher than the 
Eurozone rules established in the Stability and Growth Pact allowed.  
When the major rating agencies subsequently downgraded Greece’s credit ratings 
the European Debt Crisis, which had resulted of the financial crisis in 2007 finally hit 
Europe. Banks in the United States had gone bankrupt, and when Lehman Brothers 
collapsed in 2008 the crisis spread to the rest of the world because banks had stopped 
lending to one another. To prevent the total collapse of the banking system in Europe, the 
European governments spent 4.5 trillion Euros between 2008 and 2011.23 The EU 
launched a recovery program to support economic investment and safe jobs and social 
protection levels. However, most of the money, which was spent on this program had to 
                                            
23 Arjen Boin, The New World of Crises and Crisis Management: Implications for 
Policymaking and Research, Review of Policy Research, Issue 26 (4), 2009, pp. 367-377. 
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be borrowed. In 2009, the Eurozone countries which were most exposed to the financial 
hardship began to have difficulties financing their debt. As a result, markets lost their 
confidence in governments to pay back their debt and interest rates for the bonds of these 
governments became unsustainable. This is when the European Debt Crisis may be said 
to have started. Banks had reduced their lending to those countries and businesses with 
increased debt and unsustainable bonds. Consequently, 2009 was the year of the worst 
recession experiences by the Eurozone. Not only was there an increase of poverty, high 
unemployment and economic hardship in the countries with large amount of debt, but this 
also affected other Eurozone countries because of economic interdependence. The EU in 
cooperation with the European Central Bank and the IMF, decided to provide bailouts 
($163 billion) for the most affected countries, Ireland, Spain, Greece, and Portugal. 
However, these bailouts were linked to demands by wealthier states such as Germany, for 
austerity measures, which contributed to pessimism and unrest in the European Union.24 
It appears that policy coordination in the European Monetary Union relies on 
decentralized forms of decision-making in which peer pressure and consensus building 
between member states with little or no delegation to supranational institutions are the 
norm. However, in the Eurozone Crisis we can observe different shifts in delegation of 
power and decision- making at the national and EU level. In the main decisions pointed 
out in the following we can perceive mixed state motives in the euro crisis: a common 
interest in the survival of the euro (area) based on perceptions of interdependence and 
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potential net losses and conflicting preferences on the distribution of the burdens of 
adjustment depending on their fiscal position.25 
Step 2: Establishing a time frame of most important decisions  
 
Taking a closer look at the time line it appears that the main developments in the 
Eurozone crisis took place from 2008 to 2013. The main development, which led to the 
spread of the financial crisis to Europe, was the collapse of Lehman Brothers and other 
US banks in 2008. The first country to be hit by the crisis in Europe was Greece. This is 
an important development because it started the discussion about bailout measures and 
initiated a process of several important decisions to cope with the crisis.  
Throughout the Eurozone crisis we can identify 3 decisions from 2009 to 2013 
that build on the immediate response, and contributed to the resolution of this crisis. First, 
the establishment of a TROIKA in 2009, which is an informal group of officials from the 
EU Commission, the ECB and the IMF who help to decide on financial support and 
measures for member states affected by the crisis. Second, as more state economies 
became affected by the crisis, in 2011 the European Stability mechanism was established. 
This was an important Ad Hoc decision to primarily avoid the failure of the economies of 
Spain, Portugal and Ireland. A third important development was the Euro Summit in the 
same year where the representatives of all member states came together to work on a 
solution. This resulted in the important signing of the fiscal compact that enabled support 
for more countries for example Cyprus in 2013, and also introduced balanced budget rule 
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into national law. The fiscal compact is an important stability mechanism, which was 
further enhanced by the “two pack” in 2013.  
The timeline focuses on the period 2008- 2013, in the course of which the EU 
initial responses were unfolding, and subsequently shaped future and still ongoing 
development.  
 
Year Developments and Decisions 
2008 Lehman Brothers and other US banks 
collapse – Financial Crisis spreads to 
Europe  
2009  Greece is hit first by the crisis and bailout 
measures are decided  
2010 Establishment of the Troika 
2011 European Stability Mechanism is 
established Ad Hoc to help Portugal, Spain, 
and Ireland  
2011 Euro Summit  
2012 Fiscal Compact signed  
2013 Financial support for Cyprus  
2013 Two Pack enters into force 





Step 3: Selection of Decision-making occasions/ components  
 
 
2010 Establishment of the TROIKA  
 
The Troika is a term used to describe three international organizations that work 
together to lend money to Greece. It was established in 2010 as response to the Greek 
financial crisis and is an informal group of officials from the EU Commission, the ECB 
and the IMF. It has become a central actor in the EU crisis management framework. 
Those Member states, which seek financial support from the EU, are expected to 
negotiate the details with the Troika. The Troika then visits the country on a quarterly 
basis and assesses compliance.26 However, a positive assessment is the basis for further 
loans given to that country. It has been criticized that this form of loan giving and 
assessment exercises a certain degree of influence over the receiving country and impact 
on the formulation of national economic policy. Moreover, even though the European 
Commission, which represents the Eurozone countries, who use the euro as their 
currency, is the executive arm of the EU it must still answer to the member states of the 
EU. It can be argued that the influence member states have over the commission 
decisions ultimately has an impact on Troika decisions. Germany for example is the EU’s 
largest economy and is perceived to have the final say on the Greek bailout.27  
In addition, the IMF has a lending capacity of $750 billion which puts it in the 
position to set strict goals for the Greek bailout. However, because it is only one of the 
                                            
26 Mark Pollack, Theorizing EU Policy-Making, 2005, p.188. 
27 Frank Schimmelfennig, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, 2009, p 6. 
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lenders it only has but so much power. The Troika even though consisting of different 
members has its flaws as for example German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble is 
part of it, who had reportedly argued that the exit of Greece from the euro zone was 
necessary to save and strengthen the euro.28 The influence of certain countries can also be 
seen in the fact that the bailout measures for Greece were connected to austerity measures 
that Germany had favored whereas Belgium, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain had rather 
pushed for the ‘Europeanization’ of sovereign debt and for soft adjustment policies but 
opposed harsh sanctions for high deficit countries. These countries were in a worse 
economic and fiscal position than countries like Germany or France. However, both 
parties try to push for their own self -interest through the troika by either requesting 
austerity measures or trying to support soft policies that enable access to additional 
liquidity with minor strings attached.29 
2011 The European Stability Mechanism 
 
The ESM (European Stability Mechanism) created in 2010 under Article 122 
TFEU and 136 TFEU. It gives the Commission a major say over the disbursement of 
loans to euro zone members. According to, its statutes, the treaty leaves key decisions in 
the hands of national representatives such as Merkel and Sarkozy.30 The ESM was 
established after Merkel and Sarkozy agreed to bring forward an establishment of the 
permanent bailout fund - or European Stability Mechanism- for ailing member states and 
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they submitted their proposals to European Council President Herman Van Rompuy 
ahead of what was billed as a make-or-break summit on the euro crisis.31  
The ESM is an intergovernmental organization, whose Board of Governors 
generally decides by unanimity. Under some circumstances, members use an Emergency 
Voting Procedure, such as when the Commission and the ECB conclude that a failure to 
grant financial assistance threatens the stability of the euro area. However, a majority of 
85 per cent of the voting shares is required for decisions to be made. This means, in 
effect, that the big member states retain a veto. Second, the surveillance of fiscal and 
economic policies includes heavy involvement of the Commission in the budget planning 
process of all member states. However, in practice it is mainly involved in the budget 
planning process of the financial weak and dependent states. Moreover, these policies 
include stronger balanced budget rules, and earlier and more credible sanctions. Most 
notably, enforcement is based on ‘reverse qualified majority voting’. Reverse qualified 
voting means that a qualified majority of member states is required to reject a 
Commission proposal. Finally, whereas the ECB is vested with the power to supervise 
certain private banks directly, the resolution mechanism is designed mainly to address 
member state policy issues.32  
When creating the ESM, Germany suggested a European Banking Union, which 
had been absent from the EU’s policy agenda prior to 2012. However, after it became 
clear that Spain would also request assistance, the decision to move toward a greater 
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supervision of European banks was discussed. The Spanish banking crisis led its 
government to officially request external financial assistance. This request was posed 
immediately before the European Council meeting on 28-29 June 2012. According to 
some, this highlighted the need for a European banking union. Spain, Italy and France 
strongly advocated the use of ESM funds to directly recapitalize Spanish banks, without 
channeling the money their own treasuries. This effectively avoided adding to the debt 
burden and debt ratios of Spain (or other Member States). As a result, Germany faced a 
large coalition of like-minded Member States and European institutions advocating the 
direct recapitalization of banks via the ESM.  
At the same time, the ECB started to promote the idea of a centralizing 
supervision of banks, the Commission followed.  The president of the European Council, 
Herman Van Rompuy, who integrated this project into his report “Towards a genuine 
Economic and Monetary Union”, which was prepared together with the presidents of the 
Commission and the European Central Bank. The findings were presented in its first 
version on 26 June 2012, immediately ahead of the decisive euro area summit and 
European Council of 28- 29 June 2012.33 In the report, they advocate for actions required 
to ensure the stability and integrity of the EMU.  
As a result of support among these key figures, a high level expert group was 
established to consider financial supervision and the idea of a Banking Union.34 The 
Commission President asked Jacques de Larosière, the former IMF Managing Director 
and Governor of the Banque de France, to present a comprehensive report on the 
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appropriate measures on how to manage financial supervision. The De Larosière Report 
presented a set of r recommendations for regulatory repair. These recommendations were 
adapted by the Commission to propose a comprehensive programme of financial 
regulatory reform. Stronger requirements for banks were proposed under the fourth 
Capital Requirements Directive as well as the Capital Requirements Regulation 
(CRD4/CRR). The EU has also taken action in the field of governance by introducing 
binding rules on remuneration practices to avoid excessive risk-taking by the banks.35 
Drawing lessons from the international financial market crisis, the expert group however 
explicitly rejected the ideas of a centralized model of European financial supervision and 
micro-prudential oversight.
 
As can be seen, the EU proceeded to affect only limited 
change in its financial supervisory architecture after the financial market crisis.  
 2011 Euro Summit and Fiscal compact 
 
In December 2011 EU member states started negotiations on a new treaty on 
stability, coordination and governance in the economic and monetary union also known 
as the fiscal compact. It came about as an addition to the existing agreements and was 
agreed upon by all member states of the EU with the exception of Croatia, Czech 
Republic and the UK. Under the fiscal compact, reverse-majority voting became the 
norm and member states are committed to implement balanced budget rule into national 
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law.36 The aim of this intergovernmental agreement is to reinforce budget discipline of 
euro area governments following the sovereign debt crisis that started in 2010. Member 
states have to implement structural reforms using EU and national funds to boost 
productivity and investments.37 It extends the stability measures taken earlier and 
member states commit to a national public debt below 60 % of GDP and national deficits, 
which cannot exceed 3% of the GDP.  
This approach reflects a constructivist notion among member states. In order to 
implement the fiscal compact the member states agreed to coordinate their policies. 
However, the financial support as well as reform of economic governance was linked to 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel who saw closer economic policy coordination in 
general and more stringent fiscal rules in particular as a means to protect the interests of 
German taxpayers.38 In addition, experts stated that Germany is indeed the driving force 
behind this treaty and believe that the German commitment to complement the European 
Monetary Union with a fiscal union may eventually include joint liability, which would 
exceed the narrowly defined limits under the ESM.39 Moreover, there is evidence that 
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during the G7 Summit leading up to the decision, Merkel and Sarkozy met separately40 to 
discuss the details of the fiscal compact in advance. 
Step 4 – Unveil Pattern or specific aspects 
 
For all these reforms that have been enacted in the wake of the global financial 
crisis, the economic policy remains decentralized and in the grip of member states. Even 
though they have signed up to more intensive forms of cooperation and surveillance, 
states ultimately retain control over the formulation and implementation of fiscal policies 
and structural reforms. It is questionable if all member states have the same control. In 
fact, it seems that especially the member states, which have turned to the EU for financial 
support have less control over the implementation of fiscal policies. The crisis serves to 
reveal the underlying power realities of modern Europe. It brought creditor state power to 
the fore. This is exemplified in the critical role of Germany. At the same time, Germany 
tends to reach out for a coalition with France. Showing the heavy investment in the 
Franco-German relationship both for historical symbolism and because they accounted 
for nearly 50% of Euro Area GDP by 2011 the term ‘Merkozy’ had been coined to 
describe this central axis of power.41 This can be further underlined by the fact that as 
Sarkozy pointed out  "Things cannot continue as they have done up until today. Our 
preference is for a treaty among the 27 (EU members), so that nobody feels excluded, but 
we are open to a treaty among the 17 (euro members), open to any state that wants to 
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join us."42 This clearly shows a rational attitude towards self-interest. He describes that 
he would prefer to work on a solution with all 27 states but is willing to go on without 
some of the members.  
The Euro Summit brings about another point worth mentioning. The summit was 
supposed to enhance trans-governmentalism and bring together Euro leaders to find 
coherent solutions. However, it can be observed that member states tend to rely on ad hoc 
and informal measures involving the G8, IMF and World Bank instead of taking their 
ideas to the commission. Specific differences between member states are also not 
addressed because not all member states are represented in the G8, IMF or World Bank. 
Although, the European Union is represented as a group, the most powerful member 
states additionally have their own representative, which gives them more influence. As an 
example, in the 2009 G20 Summit on the global financial crisis, the EU was represented 
as a group. However, the UK, France, Germany and Italy also had their own 
representatives at the summit. During this summit, these leaders pushed for a common 
EU line concerning tax havens thereby back-channeling the actual EU delegation that 
was present. 43 
The crisis reveals in sharpened form the tension between solidarity and 
sovereignty among the member states of the European Union. Instead of delegating crisis 
management to the supranational level member state governments, notably France and 
Germany, have insisted on their sovereignty and claimed decisions on the national level. 
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Firstly, by doing so they have sidelined the Commission and the European Parliament in 
favor of the European Council. But also they have used the supposedly intergovernmental 
approach to push their own sovereign interests. The lessons of the crisis were twofold: 
firstly, that the intergovernmental method is unsuited to the requirements of urgent, 
decisive action in crisis; and, secondly, that the speed of markets requires a rapid 
response of the Council and if that is not possible member states revert to making rational 
choices based on their interests.  
In sum, the evidence from the negotiations is broadly in line with my 
argumentation and expectations. First, crisis management and reform deals are reached in 
intergovernmental negotiations. This is especially true for the bailout packages, the 
rescue funds EFSF and ESM and the Fiscal Compact. All were based on 
intergovernmental agreements.44 However, at each step of the crisis decision-making 
process, the major stakeholders were able to shape the terms of integration in return for 
giving up their opposition to bailing out insolvent euro zone members. This means that 
most member states seem to act according to their perception that the damage of a default 
of a euro country to be incalculable and more costly than the rescue. Wolfgang Schäuble 
commented, “The rescue is without alternative” and refused to push for the exit of Greece 
from the Eurozone.45 
In conclusion, it can be seen that the Eurozone Crisis, which might have been 
viewed from the lens of constructivism, in fact, evolved into a “realist” situation. 
Monetary policy and financial supervision rely on the decisions of key member states 
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which reacted to the Eurozone crisis with a wave of new procedures, rules and processes 
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Chapter 5 – The Refugee crisis 
 
Step 1 Historical/ institutional background  
 
The Refugee crisis began in 2011 as a result of the still ongoing war in Syria. 
According to EUROSTAT, 2014 was the year with the highest number auf asylum 
applications since 199247 with 626,000 new applications overall, 203,000 of these in 
Germany alone. Refugees and migrants are not only coming from Syria but also 
Afghanistan, Kosovo and Eritrea. The desperate situation of the refugees has become a 
hotbed for traffickers who use Libya as main departure point on the journey to Europe. 
For many refugees this journey does not end successfully and in 2015 a tragic incident 
where 800 people drowned in the sea raised awareness throughout Europe. According to 
the EU’s external border force, Frontex, 1,800,000 refugees have crossed into Europe in 
the year 2015 alone.48 This crisis became an actual challenge for the EU when Italy ended 
its Mare Nostrum Mission in 2014 since many people arrive in the European Union after 
perilous sea journeys and required basic humanitarian assistance. 49 
This search and rescue mission in the Mediterranean Sea was an important 
operation on the EU external border, which had not only rescued refugees but also 
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regulated the refugee influx through Italy. Frontex commenced with Operation Triton 
however, with a smaller budget, minimal naval resources and a much more limited search 
area. 50 Aid agencies had warned that paring down the search and rescue operations could 
increase the number of deaths in the Mediterranean and in the aftermath of this decision 
thousands of people drowned in the Mediterranean Sea. 
Following growing criticism of the inaction the EU, its member states agreed on a 
ten-point plan to increase resources and address the problem. However, refugees keep 
coming mainly by sea and this highly affects the southern European countries. By 
November of 2015 the Greek island of Lesbos declared that it could not manage the 
situation alone and called on the Greek government for support. At that point the number 
of people reaching the island had risen to 600 a day. 51 Amidst the problem Greece is 
facing, Hungary decided to build a fence along the Hungarian- Serbian border in order to 
prevent migrants and refugees from entering the country. The border fence not only 
triggered outrage among EU member states concerning the Schengen Agreement but also 
benefits traffickers because people were trying to cross the border before the fence is 
completed.52  
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The crisis was then further unfolding to Britain and France when 2,100 people 
tried to reach the UK. In its response 7 Million Pounds were invested to step up its border 
security along the tunnel connecting the UK and France. As a result, hundreds of refugees 
are stranded in a tent camp called “The Jungle” and make attempts to cross the tunnel at 
nighttime.53  
In July 2015, 50,000 migrants and refugees arrived in Greece alone and 
International Organizations like the UNHCR called on the European Union for an urgent 
European response.54 Greek Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras, asked the EU for financial 
aid claiming that Greece cannot accommodate the thousands of people. As a result, the 
European Commission approved 2.4 billion Euros of aid over six years to countries, 
which deal with a great number of refugees.  
However, the crisis has increasingly tensed. Many European countries struggle to 
cope with the great refugee influx. In August 2015, Macedonia declared a state of 
emergency after 39,000 refugees passed the country in order to reach Western Europe.55 
In Hungary, the situation escalated when Hungarian police prevented hundreds of 
refugees from boarding trains to Germany and Austria.56  
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As a response, 1,200 migrants and refugees marched 150 miles by foot from 
Budapest to Vienna, Austria, and Germany announced that it would allow the refugees to 
pass the border as an emergency measure. In the discussion about distribution of refugees 
France announced that it would take 24,000 refugees in two years and the UK commits 
accepted 20,000 refugees in five years. However, Germany is expected to take in another 
80,000 by the end of 2015. Other EU member states such as Denmark, Slovakia and 
Czech Republic resist on taking more refugees, and have tightened their border 
controls.57 Reacting to these developments, European Commission President Jean-Claude 
Juncker announced a plan for an Emergency Quota System, triggering an intense 
backlash from Hungary.58 In November 2015 Greece started relocating the first refugees 
to Luxembourg. Meanwhile, the German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble stated that 
Germany had limited possibilities and therefore has to cut back on family reunions for 
refugees and reinstate the Dublin Regulation on all EU states but Greece. After this 
announcement, Slovenia started building a razor wire fence along its border with Croatia 
and Austria following suit and announcing that they will build a 2,5 mile long fence 
along the border to Slovenia. These measures left thousands of people in no men’s lands 
outside the borders.59 In recent developments, Sweden has reimposed ID controls on its 
border to Denmark for the first time in 50 years, and Switzerland and Denmark have 
begun to implement a new policy which empowers authorities to seize cash and valuables 
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exceeding a total value of 995$ from asylum seekers upon arrival to help cover their 
expenses.60 Moreover, several EU Ministers have threatened Greece with expulsion from 
the Schengen Zone of free travel if they don’t do more to control the flow of arrivals.61  
 
Step 2:  Establishing a time frame of most important decisions  
 
Year  Developments and Decisions 
2014 Italy end the search and rescue mission 
Mare Nostrum 
April 2015 EU Member States agree on Ten Point Plan  
May 2015 The Greek island of Lesbos calls on the 
Greek government and the EU for help 
June 2015 Hungary builds a fence along its border to 
prevent refugees from entering 
July 2015 UNHCR calls on EU governments for 
immediate action  
August 2015 Macedonia declares state of emergency 
September 2015 EU Commission President announces plan 
for Emergency Quota System 
October 2015 EU Commission approves 2.4 billion euros 
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financial aid over six years for the countries 
who deal with a large number of refugees 
January 2016 EU Ministers threaten to expulse Greece 





2015 Ten- Point Plan  
 
At a Special meeting of the European Council on 23 April 2015, the Council 
decided to “mobilize all efforts at its disposal to prevent further loss of life at sea and to 
tackle the root causes of the human emergency … in cooperation with the countries of 
origin and transit.” Member states also committed themselves to working closer together 
in an effort to prevent more people from dying at sea, to increasing emergency aid to 
frontline Member States, and consider options for organizing emergency relocation 
between all Member States on a voluntary basis.62 At a subsequent joint meeting of 
Foreign and Interior Ministers was held in Luxembourg where Migration, Home Affairs 
and Citizenship Commissioner Avramopoulos presented a 10-Point Plan for immediate 
actions to be taken in response to the crisis situation in the Mediterranean. The plan 
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received the full backing of Foreign and Interior Ministers.63  
 
The Ten Points include  
 
1. Reinforce the Joint Operations in the Mediterranean, namely Triton and Poseidon, by 
increasing the financial resources and the number of assets. We will also extend 
their operational area, allowing us to intervene further, within the mandate of 
Frontex; 
2. A systematic effort to capture and destroy vessels used by the smugglers. The positive 
results obtained with the Atlanta operation should inspire us to similar operations 
against smugglers in the Mediterranean; 
3. EUROPOL, FRONTEX, EASO and EUROJUST will meet regularly and work closely 
to gather information on smugglers modus operandi, to trace their funds and to 
assist in their investigation; 
4. EASO to deploy teams in Italy and Greece for joint processing of asylum applications; 
5. Member States to ensure fingerprinting of all migrants; 
6. Consider options for an emergency relocation mechanism; 
7. A EU wide voluntary pilot project on resettlement, offering a number of places to 
persons in need of protection; 
8. Establish a new return programme for rapid return of irregular migrants coordinated by 
Frontex from frontline Member States; 
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9. Engagement with countries surrounding Libya through a joined effort between the 
Commission and the EEAS; initiatives in Niger have to be stepped up. 
10. Deploy Immigration Liaison Officers (ILO) in key third countries, to gather 
intelligence on migratory flows and strengthen the role of the EU Delegations.64 
The plan clearly indicates an approach and a political framework, which includes all 
member states together and is based on cooperation between them. However, solely 
German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, and Economic Minister Sigmar 
Gabriel developed the plan. Together they wrote about their 10-point plan in an opinion 
piece about the European refugee policy response.65 European Union minsters then 
agreed on the plan to tackle the crisis in the Mediterranean emphasizing that the ten 
actions agreed on were direct, substantial measures designed to make an immediate 
difference. As pointed out, the plan includes reinforcing joint operations in the 
Mediterranean and a systematic effort to capture and destroy vessels used by smugglers. 
Assurances were also given to support Italy and Greece in processing asylum applications 
and Member States were to ensure fingerprinting of all migrants. Announcing the plan, 
High Representative / Vice-President Federica Mogherini said, "we need to show that 
same collective European sense of urgency we have consistently shown in reacting in 
times of crisis. The dire situation in the Mediterranean is not a new nor a passing 
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However, support for the plan was not unanimous. Whereas Germany had proposed 
it, migration experts say the UK was more in favor of stopping traffickers of refugees 
instead of focusing on more expensive humanitarian issues like search-and-rescue 
operations. In fact, British Prime Minister David Cameron had originally been 
instrumental in halting Italy’s extensive rescue program Mare Nostrum, and was also 
influenced by domestic politics. Cameron’s participation in the summit which led to the 
plan came amid a general election in the UK where his campaign was focused heavily on 
immigration as an issue.67 Hence, he was reluctant to support the plan.  
 
October 2015 EU Commission 2.4 billion funding  
 
According to the UNHCR 300.000 people have crossed the Mediterranean Sea in 
2015. Unfortunately this development triggered a dispute among member states over who 
should bear responsibility for taking refugees. Instead of addressing the problem of 
distribution of refugees among member states, the European Commission approved 2.4 
billion Euros of aid over six years for countries including Greece and Italy that had 
struggled to cope with a surge in numbers of immigrants. Italy would receive the largest 
share of aid - nearly 560 million Euros, while Greece will get 473 million Euros. Britain 
received its 27 million Euros from the commission in emergency aid funding, and France 
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20 million euros.68 The EU commission issued a statement stressing that the funding was 
provided in a context of constantly increasing support to Member States. The sum 
includes 780 million Euros for relocation of 120,000 people agreed before. For another 
150 million Euro, at the beginning of 2016 the Commission will activate the Emergency 
Aid Reserve.69 
The European Commission has issued a Budget Draft for 2016, which includes the  
 
Figure 1: European Commission - Immediate operational, budgetary and legal measures under the 
European Agenda on Migration 
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above-explained budgetary considerations. To point out the allocation of resources 
among member states and the actual budget needed in order to implement the 
Commission funding, this chart, shows, which member states receive the most funding 
and which states will be significantly affected by the 2016 Budget Draft. 
 
This figure shows, that in 2014, Poland, Germany, and France accounted for the 
highest total expenditure concerning the operational, budgetary and legal measures under 
the European Agenda on Migration. When we compare that to the recently proposed  
 
Figure 2: European Commission - Immediate operational, budgetary and legal measures under the 
European Agenda on Migration  
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budget, we can observe that countries that had been hit by the Eurozone Crisis like Italy  
make major contributions as well. Those Member States who contribute to the budget  
but also have major expenses due to the refugee crisis have been considered to receiving 
funding in 2016.  
Before the Commission had proposed this budget plan, Kristalina 
Georgieva, European Commissioner for Budget and Human Resources, had invited 
German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble to speak at her conference on the European 
Budget in September 2015. At this conference he made concrete suggestions which 
measure could increase EU funding.70 
 Italian Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi, had suggested a plan to raise funds by 
issuing EU bonds that are guaranteed using its budget as collateral. That way significant 
sums could be raised to help Italy and Greece with the costs they are facing because of 
the migrant crisis. This plan was actually well received by the Commission. However, 
Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, with unusual force and speed, rejected it. David 
Cameron, who tried to renegotiate Britain’s membership and resource contributions, 
backed her this time. When taking a closer look at these objections, it becomes clear that 
both Heads of State faced extreme domestic backlash. Cameron faced an increasing 
demand for the Britain’s exit from the European Union, and Merkel’s rejection reflects 
the concern in her conservative CDU/CSU bloc about the recent electoral success of the 
rightwing Alternative for Germany party. The AFD had campaigned with an emphasis on 
                                            
70 Federal Ministry of Finance, Press, Speeches, Wolfgang Schäuble, 2015, The Future of 
EU Finances , 2015. 
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skepticism towards the euro and appealed to voters angry about Eurozone monetary 
policies.71  
 
September 2015 Quota Plan  
 
After several EU countries declared a state of emergency or even had recourse to 
extreme measures such as putting up border fences, Germany and France demanded a 
binding refugee quota for EU members. Angela Merkel and François Hollande called for 
a mechanism forcing countries to take an obligatory number of refugees in order to 
distribute refugees equally between EU member states. All European Union ministers 
voted the Emergency quota system, and the vote was overwhelmingly in favor of a plan 
to redistribute migrants and asylum-seekers from Italy, Greece, and Hungary.  
In detail, in the language of the documents “relocation means a distribution among 
Member States of persons in clear need of international protection. On the basis of a 
distribution key, the Commission will, by the end of May, propose triggering the 
emergency response system envisaged under Article 78(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and introduce a temporary European relocation 
scheme for asylum seekers who are in clear need of international protection. “ The plan 
lays out to move 15,600 migrants out of Italy, 50,400 out of Greece, and 54,000 out of 
                                            






The quotas are measured by a distribution key based on quantifiable and verifiable 
criteria that reflect the capacity of the Member States to absorb and integrate refugees, 
such as, “the size of the population (40%) as it reflects the capacity to absorb a certain 
number of refugees, total GDP (40%) as it reflects the absolute wealth and the capacity 
of an economy to absorb and integrate refugees, average number of spontaneous asylum 
applications and the number of resettled refugees per 1 Million inhabitants over the 
period 2010-2014 as it reflects the efforts of member states in the recent past and 
unemployment rate (10%) as an indicator reflecting the capacity to integrate refugees.”73 
Even though these specifics seem fair and measurable, a number of member states, 
particularly from Eastern Europe, rejected the quota plan, saying it unfairly placed the 
burden of asylum-seekers on countries that were not prepared to take them. Namely, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia voted against the deal. Finland was the 
only country to abstain mainly because of domestic struggles in the ruling center-party. 
However, Finland’s President Niinistö and his government later agreed to take in 3,190 
refugees as part of the EU quota. 
Overall, the agreed redistribution of a first group of 160,000 refugees is moving 
slowly. And for some countries it almost appears to be a form of sabotage for an 
unpopular decision. This means, they accepted the EU decision but purposely postponed 
                                            
72 European Commission, Home Affairs, European Scheme for relocation and 
resettlement, 2015. 
73 European Commission, Home Affairs, European Scheme for relocation and 
resettlement, 2015. 
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dealing with its redistributive costs. Germany wants to make this initially voluntary 
redistribution a permanent mechanism, and received backing from Sweden and Austria74 
whereas Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico said those who decided to push through 
quotas nonsensically caused a deep rift over a very sensitive issue. However, the three 
countries that voted against the proposal — the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia 
— would be required to accept migrants against their will under European law. Poland, 
which had previously opposed the proposal, voted in favor of it.  
Even though, Germany is very fond of this quota system and German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel said that such a plan would be a "first step", stressing the importance of 
shared responsibility among all member states; the plan has been criticized by the UN 
refugee agency (UNHCR), which says it is insufficient and the EU needed to go much 
further and faster. According to the UNHCR, the resettlement program would only be 
equivalent of just 20 days' worth of arrivals at the current rate. So they point out that 
overall the proposed quota system does not cope sufficiently with the influx. 75  
Step 4: Unveiled Patterns  
 
In this case study it becomes obvious, that Germany and France do not form a 
coalition anymore as they did in former decision-making processes. One can only 
speculate that this may be due to the election outcome in France, which brought Hollande 
                                            
74 Siobhán O'Grady, Mapped: What Each EU Country Impacted by New Quota Plan 
Thinks About Refugees, Foreign Policy, September 2015. 
75 Adam Withnall, Refugee crisis: EU ministers try to agree quotas - as UN says even its 
best offer is not enough, The Independent, September 2015. 
 49 
to power and broke the “Merkozy” alliance. In any event, this development results in a 
struggle within the Union because it has become rather unclear who the major powers or 
stakeholders are. Decisions have become lengthy and inefficient since more states are 
now trying to influence the outcome and find a solution to the crisis. However, when 
states come forward with ideas, like Italy ion budgetary issues, they are often turned 
down ultimately by Germany. Concluding, the Refugee Crisis appears to be an example 
for realist state behavior in the European Union. Displayed not only by the powerful 
member states but also by smaller states, which insisted on their sovereignty.  
At first glance, the decision to increase funding for those countries, which receive 
most refugees seems like a constructivist approach of burden sharing. However, I argue 
that this decision reflects classic rational choice behavior. The most influential member 
such as France and the UK agreed to the decision to avoid relocation of refugees to their 
own countries or contribution of a greater amount of resources. Especially the case of the 
UK shows how domestic politics influence the decisions that Cameron favored in the 
Union or pushed back against. Surprisingly, the countries, which least speak up are 
countries such as the Eastern European and Southern European countries, which have 
most at stake since they receive most of the refugees. They try to push for a timely 
solution, however, they heavily depend on the funding that lies in the hand of the most 
powerful decision makers.  
In the case of Germany, one could argue that it follows a constructivist approach of 
burden sharing because Merkel agreed to take in a large amount of refugees, and 
contribute resources to help member states, which are more affected. However, it can also 
be interpreted as rational behavior and calculated strategy from Merkel to use this crisis 
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in order to give Germany a new perception in the world and enhance Germanys 
international status. This can be seen as constructivist behavior were perceptions are 
important but also as very rational behavior, which aims to maximize the status of the 
state in the global order.  
In this argument fits a quote by German interior minister De Maiziere who said "We 
have to keep the pressure on," meaning the pressure on the other member states who have 
yet to implement decisions that have already been made in the area of refugee policy. 
 
Findings  
When looking at both case studies in comparison, it can be pointed out that the 
decision-making process is mainly influenced by the most powerful states in the union. In 
the Eurozone crisis, it is evident that the stake in the decision making process was clearly 
on Germany and France. Even though, individual nations like Greece, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal would expected to have an enhanced interest and say in the solution drafting 
because they were most affected. The same can be said in the refugee crisis were the 
main decisions are made by the most influential member states like Germany and the UK, 
whereas smaller states have more at stake. This directly relates to the argument I am 
making that the most powerful states make the decisions in crisis situations.  
It can be said, that in the Eurozone crisis and in the Refugee crisis, coalitions 
between states play a key role. Referring to the Eurozone crisis, a coalition between 
France and Germany is observable and seems to influence decisional outcome in a rather 
successful way. However, most of the time it turns out that these coalitions are only 
formed between the most powerful while there are no coalitions between less powerful 
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states. These coalitions then seem to be an extension of gain maximization on another 
level to remain in control. In contrast, the Refugee crisis shows that the lack of coalition 
opportunity leads to a struggle within the Union. In this scenario, France and Germany do 
not agree on significant policy suggestions, and in addition they cannot count on the UK 
to form a coalition with either one of them since Cameron is more concerned about 
domestic issues. Therefore, each of them tries to push autonomously for their best 
interest. As a consequence, the European Union is in a state were it can be described as 
divided and basic principles such as the Schengen Agreement are simply discarded.  
Concerning the other factors I was trying to identify, from the evidence presented 
we can also draw that member state interest seems to play a key role in EU decision-
making. This can especially be seen in the way Germany tried to gain influence by 
strategically positioning its ministers in the different institutions and even expert groups 
to remain in control throughout the decision-making process in the Eurozone crisis. In 
addition, state interest behavior can be observed in the refugee crisis in the relocation 
deal, which was mainly pushed for by Angela Merkel. In this particularly situation the 
power struggle presents itself through the other countries that try to gain back their 
influence. This situation can also be perceived as potential threat to national security for 
some states and lead to decisions such as building a border fence (Hungary) or 
reintroduced ID checks at the border (Sweden). These are examples, which indicate that 
in crisis situations states revert to rational behavior based on realist theory.  
On the institutional level, it seems that EU bodies, especially the EU Commission 
are often instrumentalized by member states. They use their position in the EU 
commission to make sure the other members adopt their ideas. This role seems to have 
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changed when we compare both crisis situations. In the Eurozone crisis heads of state 
assumed a key role in crisis management, however, they worked in a practical manner 
together with the EU institutions whereas, in the current refugee crisis, EU bodies are 
often bypassed and the mode of governance is not cooperative. This also points out, that 
according to my evidence, norm-driven behavior that is based on the shared ideas and 


































Chapter 6 - Conclusion 
 
 
For all these reforms that have been enacted in the wake of the global financial 
crisis the economic policy remains decentralized and in the grip of member states. Even 
though they agreed on cooperation and surveillance, member states remain in control 
over the formulation and implementation of fiscal policies and structural reforms. In this 
context, the amount of control is distributed unequally among the member states.  
Especially the smaller states, which have turned to the EU for financial support, retain 
less control over their fiscal policies.  
The crises reveal the underlying power realities of modern Europe. It brought 
creditor state power to the fore. This is exemplified in the core role of Germany. 
However, Germany tends to reach out for a coalition with France. By 2011 the term 
‘Merkozy’ had been coined to describe this central axis of power well.76 This can be 
further underlined by the fact that Sarkozy pointed out  "Things cannot continue as they 
have done up until today. our preference is for a treaty among the 27 (EU members), so 
that nobody feels excluded, but we are open to a treaty among the 17 (euro members), 
open to any state that wants to join us."77 It shows a rational attitude in which other 
states can only join on a decision, which had previously been made between only a few 
powerful countries and is in France’s best interest.  
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77 Spiegel Online, “Germany and France Agree: Merkozy to Seek New EU Treaty to 
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Overall, the Eurozone crisis revealed the tension between solidarity and 
sovereignty. Member state governments, such as France and Germany, have reverted 
crisis management to a realist and sovereign approach.. As I mentioned, they have in 
some cases sidelined the EU bodies, the Commission and the European Parliament, in 
favor of decisions in the European Council. This way they used the supposedly 
constructivist intern-governmental approach to push their own sovereign interests. This 
shows that in conclusion a constructivist method is unsuited for the urgent, decisive 
action in crisis. This supports my argument that the immediacy of these crises requires a 
rapid response, and member states revert to making rational choices based on their 
interests.  
 
In sum, the evidence from the negotiations is broadly in line with my 
argumentation and expectations. First, the major crisis management and reform deals 
have been reached in negotiations but based on previous bargaining by member states, 
coalition building or even agreed upon drafts. This is especially true for the bailout 
packages, the rescue funds EFSF and ESM and the Fiscal Compact, which are all based 
on such agreements.78 At each step of crisis decision-making, the most influential states 
were able to shape the terms of integration in return for some degree of cooperation 
between member states in order to rescue those states most affected by the crisis. This 
means most member states seem to act according to their perception that the damage of a 
default of another Eurozone country is incalculable and more costly than the rescue.  
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In conclusion, it can be seen that in the Eurozone Crisis methods of traditional 
decision-making based on a constructivist approach have been replaced by a more realist 
approach.. Monetary policy and financial supervision rely on the decisions of key 
member states which reacted to the Eurozone crisis with a wave of new procedures, rules 
and processes which are not relied on the community as a whole and their ideas and 
norms. 79 The same can be said about the Refugee crisis, which showed that states agree 
to constrain their own autonomy and sovereignty largely in response to an unusual power 
configuration and for security reasons. The Refugee influx is widely perceived as a 
common threat and leads to an overwhelming response of autonomous measures without 
any coordination. In this scenario, norm driven behavior becomes peripheral.  
Looking forward, I assume that based on my findings, the worsening division in 
the EU over what to do about the refugees and the future of the EU as a whole, especially 
when we refer to the Schengen area is going to continue. German chancellor, Angela 
Merkel, recently led a summit with seven other government leaders from Scandinavia, 
Benelux, Austria, and Greece, which was intended to reach an agreement on the still 
pending issue of ways and means, to apply quotas, and to confirm a deal with Turkey. 
This deal is supposed to implement an exchange of refugees for 3 billion Euros and was 
reached between Turkey and the EU. However, Merkel is the driving force behind this 
deal. The fact, that Merkel could only attract eight out of the 28 member states to join her 
in the summit to discuss the issue shows, that there is no majority in the EU, which would 
support this initiative. Moreover, Hollande made clear that France would not take part in 
schemes like this and would simply take on an observer status. This is just to point out, 
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that the divide is still ongoing and the member states, which constitute the European 
Union seem to be drifting further apart.  
Overall, further research could be done in the area of my research. It would be highly 
interesting to look at other crises that the EU had to face in other areas of high or low 
politics such as health or the environment. The Dioxin crisis or BSE have already been 
analyzed in studies about the EU crisis capacity but would maybe serve as an interesting 
case to analyze decision-making and actor behavior.  In terms of EU crisis management 
capacity this thesis could be a starting point for research on the question if the EU could 
do more in this domain. A cost-benefit analysis would probably be helpful to assess what 
is needed resource-wise in crisis situations and what states are able to contribute. Overall, 
investing in capacities could significantly decrease the cost of crises. Moreover, there 
might also new crises to be expected in the future of the European Union especially 
concerning the environment, energy and resource supply which could challenge the 
cooperative and underlying design of the Union.  
Concerning, this design, it becomes clear, that ultimately the EU is built on the idea 
of shared ideas and values, and these become less important in crisis situations. The 
threats of finding a timely solution along with insecurities that pose an exogenous threat 
on states enhance the occurrence of realist behavior. I think that in recent years, it became 
clearer that the way crises are addressed is also a generational phenomenon. I recently 
attended The Max Weber Conference on Democracy and Expertise where a German 
student when asked how she would describe the EU in three words replied “ unity, shared 
ideas and cooperation”. Renée Haferkamp, Former Director General of the European 
Commission, then said, “Well, you just described what the EU is not”. This personal 
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example shows that despite crises there seems to be a sentiment of unity among young 
Europeans.  
Finally, the further question is whether the crises the European Union faces are just a 
bump in the road in the process of European integration overall or not. Some member 
states like the UK have already flagged the possibility of exiting out of the European 
Union. We will have to observe in the future, if states will continue to integrate despite 
the obstacles they face or if crises are ultimately going to spread instability and lead 
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